Where armed conflict clusters in Myanmar, how its geography is changing, and whether it spreads. 330 townships, January 2021 to September 2025.
One question in three parts: where violence clusters, how that is changing, and whether it spreads from one township to the next.
Where does armed conflict in Myanmar cluster, how is it changing, and does it spread? Since the coup of February 2021 the war has moved from the borderlands into the Bamar heartland, and it has kept moving.
Data. ACLED events (battles, explosions and remote violence, violence against civilians), joined by location to the 330 MIMU township polygons. Protests and strategic developments are excluded: they are not armed conflict.
Approach. Local Moran’s I and Gi* for where; a 19-quarter space-time cube with Mann-Kendall and emerging hot spot analysis for how it changes; a spatial Markov chain for whether it spreads.
Darker townships on the map have more events; the dry zone and the Thai border stand out.
What I removed
6 events coded to the Indian Ocean.
93 events placed on a regional centroid (geo_precision 3). Kept, they would pile false violence onto whichever township holds the centroid.
111 events have no township name, so I joined every event by its coordinates, not its name. A name join would have lost all of them.
What I kept but distrust
Fatalities. The top 1% of events carry 21% of reported deaths. Analysed, never used to build the cube.
Zeros in Wa and Mongla. 8 townships record nothing in five years; seven are in ceasefire enclaves that report almost nothing. They anchor a cold spot that partly measures silence.
Skew. Counts run from 0 to 1,039. The statistics use log(1 + count), checked against raw counts.
Violence climbed through 2021 and peaked with Operation 1027 in November 2023. Explosions and remote violence overtook battles in 2023, driven by the military’s air campaign: 88 air or drone strikes in 2021, 2,977 in 2024. An air strike lands where the military chooses, not where the fighting is.
All political violence, p < 0.05, 999 permutations.
Global Moran’s I is 0.67. A township’s violence is very well predicted by its neighbours’.
One dominant core: the dry zone of Sagaing, Magway and Mandalay, with a second belt down the Thai border through Kayin, Mon and Tanintharyi.
Cold spots: the Ayeyarwady delta, Yangon and eastern Shan.
No High-Low outliers at all. Violence in Myanmar does not form islands; it comes in neighbourhoods.
82 to 96% of townships keep their class under raw counts or 6-nearest-neighbour weights. About half survive a false discovery rate correction: the cluster cores.
Local Moran’s I by type. Battles add the ethnic fronts in Chin, Kachin and Kayah. Violence against civilians is the most concentrated: 88% of its High-High townships are in the dry zone. Fatalities follow battles.
Mann-Kendall test on each township’s 19-quarter Gi* series, p < 0.05.
Cooling: Yangon. 44 of its 45 townships have a falling Gi*. The urban resistance of 2021 is gone from the map.
Warming: the middle belt. Bago West, Mandalay, Magway, Bago East and Tanintharyi, where the war arrived late as the dry-zone insurgency spread and new fronts opened.
Sagaing barely registers, because it was hot from 2021 and stayed hot. A trend test cannot see a level, which is the gap emerging hot spot analysis fills.
Intensifying, the most urgent: Dawei, Yesagyo, Seikphyu, Madaya, Myingyan, Ngazun. Hot in nearly every quarter and still rising, five of six in the dry zone.
Consecutive, a front that moved and held: Kyaukkyi and Shwegyin through Kyaikto and Bilin to Kawkareik and Myawaddy on the Thai border.
Oscillating hot spots fill Sagaing and Magway. Not unstable: they were cold in the coup quarter, before the resistance existed, and have been hot since.
Persistent cold spots are the Shan hills, including Wa and Mongla.
Fine classes are fragile: 62% of townships keep their label on a monthly cube, 78% keep hot/cold/neither. Every label was checked against an independent Gi* series, because sfdep 0.2.5 can attach labels to the wrong townships.
Value-added: a spatial Markov chain. Each township-quarter is active (3 or more events) or quiet. Does a quiet township’s chance of becoming active depend on its neighbours?
Yes, by a factor of four: 9% with no active neighbour, 36% with most neighbours active.
It is not just “a violent region”. With fixed effects for state and quarter and the township’s own history, the odds ratio is 4.1 (bootstrap 2.8 to 6.6). Shuffling townships’ histories across the map never reproduces the gap (p < 0.002). It holds at 1, 3 and 6 events.
Out of sample it is a modest signal: AUC 0.73 from own history, 0.75 with neighbours.
Since Operation 1027, isolated outbreaks have almost stopped. A quiet township with no active neighbour ignited 13% of the time before the offensive and 4% after. Onset next to active neighbours did not change (36% and 36%).
New violence now appears at the edge of existing violence: a war of consolidated fronts rather than the scattered uprising of 2021.
The map: townships quiet in 2025 Q3, shaded by the share of neighbours active. The warmest are where the evidence says to look next, most of them in Magway, Sagaing, Kachin and Mandalay. Not a validated forecast.
For peace-building
Prioritise the intensifying hot spots (Madaya, Myingyan, Seikphyu, Yesagyo, Ngazun, Dawei) for protection and humanitarian access: established violence that is still rising.
Watch the quiet edges, not the centres. Early warning and preparedness belong in quiet townships beside active ones.
Treat the southeast as a moving front, where cross-border routes from Thailand matter most.
Plan for air-strike exposure beyond battle lines. Battle maps alone will not locate it.
Limitations
ACLED counts reports, not violence. Hot spots partly reflect visibility; the Wa and Mongla zeros are the clearest case. A cold spot is not proof of safety.
Counts, not rates. No reliable township population exists for 2021-2025.
Scale and neighbours. Townships run from under 1 km² to over 12,000 km², and contiguity treats every border as equally permeable.
EHSA depends on the window, which starts in the coup quarter, and its fine classes move with parameter choices.
Diffusion is descriptive. An advancing front and contagion look alike at quarterly resolution.